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PREFERENTIAL REMEDIES
FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Harry T. Edwards* and Barry L. Zaretsky**

JT is no secret that throughout our history discrimination against
minorities and women has been a hallmark of American society.
Although some effort has been made to abrogate existing discrimination and eliminate the effects of two hundred years of inequity, we are still far from the goal of equality for all. Over twenty
years ago, in Brown v. Board of Education,1 the Supreme Court
struck down the doctrine of "separate but equal" and declared that
the Constitution requires "color blindness" in dealing with people
of different races. More specifically, the Court held that forced racial segregation of children in public schools (and, by implication, in
any other state activity) was unconstitutional. As an abstract idea,
the principle of color blindness-that factors such as race cannot be
used as indicators of merit or worth-is extremely attractive. However, in the two decades since Brown it has become obvious that
the goal of racial equality will never be reached solely through adherence to this neutral principle. 2 While the principle of color
blindness is just, it has failed to effectively alter long-standing patterns of race and sex discrimination in this country. This failure is
due, at least in part, to the difficulty involved in proving noncompliance with an order to act in a "neutral" or "nondiscriminatory"
fashion. More importantly, ordering an offender to discontinue a
discriminatory practice has simply proved ineffectual without supporting affirmative relief. The inherent limitations of the principle
of color blindness and the need for more definite affirmative relief
are best seen in the context of employment discrimination.
When Congress passed title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
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1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1· (1971)
(school segregation); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974) (employment discrimination). See generally Blumrosen, Quotas, Common Sense, and Law
in Labor Relations: Three Dimensions of Equal Opportunity, 21 RuroERs L. REV.
675 (1974).
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1964,3 it plainly recognized equal employment opportunity as an essential national goal. To effectuate this goal, the courts and various
federal agencies in the past decade have developed the notion of
"affirmative action." 4 Efforts to implement a policy of equal employment opportunity through the use of affirmative action programs
received great support until many people realized that equal rights
for minority members and women would mean increased competition for limited job opportunities. This realization has led to cries
of "reverse discrimination" in response to affirmative action and to
calls for applying the principle of color blindness that in reality may
be disguised attempts to keep minorities and women from gaining
in the job market. The current recession has caused increased interest in the legal, economic, and moral issues surrounding the legitimacy of affirmative action; since the number of available jobs has
become more limited, an employer may in fact be forced to hire a
minority member or female for a position formerly reserved for a
white male. 5
A basic thesis of this article is that much of the current concern
about alleged "reverse discrimination" in employment ignores the
reality of the situation. In Part I it will be contended that although
color blindness is a laudable long-run objective, it alone will not end
discrimination; thus, it will be argued that some form of "<:olor conscious" affirmative action must be employed in order to achieve
equal employment opportunity for minorities and women. The most
effective form of affirmative action is temporary preferential treatment, 6 and it will be asserted in Part II that such relief can be justified under the Constitution. Similarly, in Part m, it will be argued
that preferential remedies can be justified under present statutory
provisions governing employment discrimination. Finally, in Part
IV, two conclusions will be drawn: first, that while it is accurate
to suggest that some minority persons or women who currently benefit from preferential remedies might not have been hired but /or
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to -17 (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973),
4. "Affirmative action" and "preferential remedies" are distinguishable concepts;
the latter is subsumed by the former. "Affirmative action," in a general sense, includes a number of remedies for employment discrimination, such as governmental
agency prods to get employers to make good faith efforts to hire or promote more
minorities or women, special training programs for minorities and women, and preferential hirings or promotions for minorities or women. Only the last-cited remedy,
i.e., preferential hirings and promotions, positively requires an employer to give preference to qualified minority persons or women (usually over white males) when hiring, promoting, or retaining employees in certain designated job positions.
5. See authorities cited in note 161 infra.
6. Cf. note 4 supra.
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their race or sex, this does not mean that these individuals are not
qualified, and second, that the opponents of preferential remedies
have grossly exaggerated the impact of such remedies by failing to
recognize that, in reality, the cases in which preferential remedies
have been ordered have generally involved small numbers of positions and have imposed the remedy for relatively short periods of
time.
Before proceeding, however, it is necessary to point out that this
article will take a broad approach, sometimes sacrificing specificity
in an attempt to provide an overview to the problem of preferential
remedies. It is hoped that this overview will demonstrate that the
true value of the preferential remedy is in raising the consciousness
of the community and encouraging voluntary affirmative action programs that will, by putting people together in the workplace, teach
that all are equal.

I.

THE NEED FOR PREFERENTIAL REMEDIES

Despite the Supreme Court's mandate of color blindness in
Brown7 and the sweeping civil rights legislation that followed ten

years later, 8 statistics demonstrate that Blacks are still far behind
white males in the employment market. For example, in 1973 the
median income for black families was only $7,269, compared to
$12,595 for white families. 9 The ratio of median family income of
Blacks to Whites decreased in the period 1969-1973 from 0.61 to
0.5.8,10 indicating that income differentials actually increased as we
entered the seventies. In almost every major occupational category,
the income of black males trails that of white males;11 furthermore,
Blacks have a disproportionately low percentage of the more desir1. See also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
8. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C. § 1447, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-75d,
2000a to 2000h-6 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (Supp. III, 1973).
9. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CuRRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, SPECIAL Sn!DIES, SERIES P-23, No. 48, Tim SocIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS
OF TIIE BLACK POPULATION IN TIIE UNITED STATES 1973, at 17 (1974) [hereinafter
1973 CuRRENT POPULATION REPORTS]. The Bureau of the Census recently reported
that the jobless rate for Blacks in 1974 was 13.7 per cent, while the rate for Whites
was 7 .6 per cent. It was also reported that the median income for a black family
was $7800 in 1974, an increase of 7.4 per cent over 1973. But, after adjusting for
the effects of inflation, actual purchasing power of black families declined by 3.2 per
cent. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURR.ENT POPULATION
REPORTS, SPECIAL Sn!DIES, SERIES P-23, No. 54, 'fim SocIAL AND EcONOMIC STATUS
OF TIJE BLACK POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1974, at 24, 53 (1975).
10. 1973 CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, supra note 9, at 1.
11. Id. at 59. Some of the disparities may be attributable to differences in age,
education, and job experience of Blacks and Whites. Id. at 52.
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able jobs in our economy.12 In addition, the proportion of Blacks
·below the low-income level seems to have increased; in 1959 about
one quarter of the persons below the low-income level were Black,
while in 1973 Blacks made up approximately one third of this
,group.13 A comparison of unemployment rates further evidences
our lack of progress toward equalizing the employment situation of
Blacks and Whites. In 1960, the ratio of black unemployed workers
to white was 2.1 to 1. By 1970 this ratio had decreased to 1.8 to
1, but by 1973 it was again 2.1 to 1. 14 Although part of this trend
is attributable to changes in family structure and other sociological
factors, 15 it nevertheless suggests that the progress toward equal employment opportunity made in the sixties has slowed, if not stopped,
in the seventies.
Considerable disparity is also evident between the economic
status of women and that of white males. In 1972, the median income for full-time female workers was $5,903, compared to $10,202
for males. 16 In 1970, the median income for women was 59.4 per
cent of the median income for men, a gap considerably wider than
that existing in 1955 when the median income for women was 63.9
per cent of the median income for men. 17 Furthermore, in 1970,
13.5 per cent of full-time male workers earned at least $15,000 per
year, while only 1.1 per cent of full-time female workers were in
that salary range. 18 Even in general occupational groups, women
earn considerably less than their male counterparts. 19 Although this
disparity in large part reflects the fact that women hold the lowerlevel jobs within most of these groups, 20 women also tend to lag in
12. See id. at 56 (Table 40, Occupation of the Employed Population: 1973).
13. Id. at 29.
14. Id. at 45.
15. See id. at 1. ("[T]he changes in the overall (income) ratio reflect, in part,
the changes in the mix of the population, such as changes in the proportion of husband-wife families with wives in the paid labor force, the proportion of families
headed by women, the number of earners in a family, occupational distribution, and
work experience patterns").
16. EMPLOYMENT SrANDARDS .ADMN., WOMAN'S BUREAU, DEPT. OF LABOR, HIGH•
LIGHTS OF WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT AND EDUCATION 1 (1974).
17. EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMN,, WOMAN'S BUREAU, DEPT. OF WOR, FAcr
SHEET ON TiiE EARNINGS GAP 1 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 FACT SHEET].
18. Id. at 3.
19. Id. at 2.
20. In public elementary and secondary schools, women were less than 20 per
cent of the principals, superintendents, deputy, associate, and assistant superintendents, and other central office administrators in 1970-1971.
Among professional and technical workers in business, women are concentrated in the class B and class C computer programer positions, while men are
more frequently employed in the higher paying class A positions. Similarly,
women are usually in the lowest category of draftsmen and engineering techni-

November 1975]

Preferential Remedies

5

earnings when compared to men employed in the same jobs. 21 In
addition, the failure of women to enter the higher paying jobs in
many occupational groups may be attributable to the lack of opportunity caused by sex discrimination.
It is clear, then, that the problem of employment discrimination
is still very serious twenty years after the policy of racial neutrality
was stated in Brown and ten years after the passage of title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In one sense this should not be surprising-practices that have been in existence for two hundred years
do not disappear easily. Discrimination has become engrained as
a way of life in this country and, although much of the conscious discrimination has ceased, the habitual, unconscious patterns of discrimination remain with us today. White males still receive preferences
in a number of positions, and minority persons and women still believe that there are many jobs for which they will not be given serious consideration. The "old boy" system of favoritism has worked
well for years to keep white males in preferred job positions.
The continued existence of long-standing myths about the inherent inability of Blacks and women to perform certain work22 has contributed to their exclusion from meaningful positions in the job market. 23 Until recently, Blacks and women have not been accepted
in the prestigious university graduate programs that serve as the
training ground for many important professional jobs. In addition,
cians.
Among managers and proprietors, women frequently operate small retail establishments, while men may manage manufacturing plants or wholesale outlets.
In the manufacturing of men's and boys' suits and coats, women are likely
to be employed as hand finishers, thread trimmers and basting pullers, and sewing machine operators-jobs where their average hourly earnings are less than
$2.70-while men are likely to be employed as finish pressers (hand or
machine), underpressers, cutters, and markers-with average hourly earnings of
$3.50 to $4.25.
In the service occupations, women are likely to be cooks, nurses' aides, and
waitresses, while men are likely to be employed in higher paying jobs as bartenders, guards, custodians, firemen, policemen, and detectives.
Id. at 4.
21. See, e.g., id. at 5 (Table, Median Salary of Full-Time Employed Civilian Sci-

entists, by Sex and Field, 1970).
22. See Murphy, Sex Discrimination in Employment-Can We Legislate a Solution?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 437, 444 (1971). See generally M. GoLDSCHMID, BLACK AMERICANS AND WHITE RACISM 138-86 (1970); RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THB UNITED
STATES 137-283 (T. Pettigrew ed. 1975).
23. See, e.g., Duncan, Patterns of Occupational Mobility Among Negro Men, in
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THB UNITED STATES, supra note 22, at 167; Johnson &
Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 675, 738-41 (1971); Lieberson & Fuguitt, Negro-White Occupational Differences in the Absence of Discrimination, in RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN TIIB UNITED
STATES, supra, at 187. See generally Ginzberg & Hiestand, Employment Patterns of
Negro Men and Women, in THE AMERICAN NEGRO REFERENCE BOOK 205-50 (J. Davis ed. 1966).
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discriminatory employment tests have been used to perpetuate the
. fable of white male superiority, and employer recruitment and training practices have been effectively used to screen out qualified
Blacks and women from jobs in both the public and private sectors.
These types of discriminatory practices will not be effectively defeated by neutral policies; progress under the color blindness concept
has been slow and halting, defeating the promise of equal employment, opportunity made in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Given the
evidence at hand, it is clear that some forms of preferential remedies
that consider race and sex as factors in employment decisions are
necessary to break the habit of employment discrimination. 24
This is not to say that Blacks or women must be thrust into positions for which they are not qualified. 25 However, when the choice
is between qualified white males and other qualified individuals, we
should open the available positions to those who formerly could not
occupy them. Because of the overt preference historically shown
for white males in the job market, this group has been conditioned
to expect and receive a preference over qualified Blacks and women.
This cycle can only be broken by reversing the preference temporarily until people learn to work with completely neutral criteria.
Several arguments can be put forward to support the claim that
the use of preferential remedies is both illogical and unjust. First,
it can be argued that regardless of the traditional preference shown
white males in the job market, to now prefer Blacks and women unfairly "punishes" innocent white males for the misdeeds of their
predecessors. Second, it can be contended that white male employees should not suffer in today's job market merely because certain
employers were guilty of race and sex discrimination in the past.
Finally, it has been argued that because the Blacks and women who
may now benefit from job preferences are not the same individuals
who were victims of discrimination in the past, they are being rewarded for the wrongs done to their ancestors.
These arguments, however, fail to place the preferential remedy
in its proper perspective. For one thing, it should be noted that
court-ordered or legislatively imposed preferential remedies are not
nearly as widespread as the current debates over affirmative action
might suggest. There are relatively few situations in which preferences have been mandated and effectively enforced, and in these
24. See, e.g., NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Blumrosen, supra note 2.
25. In fact, the cases almost invariably note that only qualified minority persons
or females may receive any preference in employment decisions. See, e.g., NAACP
v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1974).
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few situations the preferential remedies have been carefully circumscribed. 26 Furthermore, while there may be an element of unfairness in the preferential remedy, some price must be paid to overcome the long-standing and pervasive patterns of race and sex bias
in this nation. The minor injustice that may result from the use of
narrowly circumscribed preferential remedies is, on balance, outweighed by the fact that temporary preferential remedies appear to
be the only way to effectively break the cycle of employment discrimination and open all levels of the job market to all qualified applicants.
The arguments against the use of preferential remedies also
overlook an obvious but crucial factor-preferential remedies are
designed to foster, not inhibit, equal employment opportunity. This
characteristic distinguishes preferential remedies from the traditional
overt discrimination in favor of white males; preferential remedies
only temporarily favor one group in order to place all individuals on
a par. This characteristic also obviates the apparent inconsistency
in the argument that in order to end one preference (in favor of
white males), other preferences (in favor of minorities and women)
must be introduced. Preferential remedies granted to end employment discrimination may be likened to starting one controlled forest
fire in order to bring a raging one under control. At first the idea
may seem illogical, but the remedial principle is sound. And, of
course, if the goal of equal employment opportunity is to be achieved
then we must find remedies that work. 27
In dealing with employment discrimination cases, the courts have
begun to demonstrate a growing awareness that the goal of equal
opportunity cannot be implemented effectively solely through neutral employment practices. It would seem obvious that even if all
employers hereafter hired on a nondiscriminatory basis, it would still
be years before Blacks and women reached a status in the job market comparable to that of white males. Thus, if the pattern of discrimination is to be broken, the present effects of past discrimination
must be eliminated. 28 In the context of public school desegregation,
26. See R. SMITH, H. E.DwARDs & R. CLARK, LABOR R.m.AnoNs IN nm PUBLIC
SEcI'OR 1179-81 (1974).

27. Green·v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Cf. Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th
Cir. 1974).
28. See, e.g., the figures cited in NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621 (5th Cir.
1974), on the effectiveness of quota relief in that case. The district court in NAACP
v. Dothard, 7 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 129 (M.D. Ala. 1974), compared the progress in hiring Blacks in two cases, one of which used quotas and the other of which
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the Supreme Court has noted that the courts must develop remedies
that promise "realistically to work, and . . . to work now." 20 This
dictum is equally applicable in the employment context; discrimina-tion simply must be ended in the most expeditious manner feasible. 30
When a company, a government agency, or a union has discriminated
against a segment of society for many years, a mere resolve to adopt
neutral policies will not resolve the problem now. Some means .of
bringing the discriminated-against group up to the level it would
have been but for the discrimination must be employed. 31
A number of different remedies have been authorized by Congress and utilized by the courts to end employment discrimination.
Injunctions have been issued against further discrimination82 and
against strikes or other interferences with plans to end discrimination. 33 Additionally, courts have ordered employers to disseminate
job information specifically aimed at the discriminated-against
group, 34 keep detailed records to ensure nondiscriminatory hiring, 36
hire and provide back pay for individuals who have been the victims
of discrimination, 36 provide pre-test tutoring for job applicants, 37 expand apprenticeship and training programs,38 and pay punitive damages. 38 Nevertheless, in certain cases it has been found that these
denied quotas, and found that significant progress was made only when quotas were
ordered.
29. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). Accord Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13 (1971).
30. See, e.g., NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974).
31. See Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416
F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969).
32. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 625 (2d Cir. 1974);
NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Ironworkers
Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 548 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210, 220 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 851 (1972).
34. See, e.g., Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1974); United
States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 377-78 (8th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Ironworkers Local 86,443 F.2d 544,548 (9th Cir. 1971).
35. See, e.g., Morrow v. Crisler, 479 F.2d 960, 967 (5th Cir. 1973); affd. on
rehearing, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479
F.2d 354, 3'80-82 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d
544, 548 (9th Cir. 1971).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 548 (9th Cir.
1971); Heat & Frost Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1053 (5th Cir.
1969).
37. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 319 (8th Cir. 1971), modified
on rehearing, 452 F.2d 327 (8th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
38. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 627 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 552-54 (9th Cir. 1971).
39. Plaintiffs have been permitted to seek punitive damages only in a few district
court cases. See, e.g., Dessenberg v. American Metal Forming Co., 6 BNA Fair
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remedies are often unsatisfactory methods of eliminating the effects
of proscribed employment bias. In particular, a number of courts
have held that some form of preferential remedy is the most effective
means of enforcing equal employment opportunity when the facts
show a long history of discrimination against a protected class.40
Remedial preferences have been used in a number of different
ways. For example, courts have required employers to hire according to ratios of minority to white employees. 41 The employer may
be ordered to use the ratio until minority workers comprise a certain
percentage of the total work force, 42 or the court may demand that
the employer adhere to the ratio until he hires a certain number of
minority workers.43 Another form of preferential remedy is fictional
seniority, which provides less-senior minority workers protection
against layoffs, or gives them preferences in promotions or transfers,
by awarding them more seniority than they would have ordinarily
accumulated under existing employment practices.44 In each instance, the preferential remedy is by definition temporary and is
used only until the discrimination pattern is broken.

JI. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES:
THE PROBLEM OF REVERSE DISCRIMINATION
Whether preferential remedies are constitutional is an issue that
has not been fully resolved;45 moreover, few courts have analyzed
Emp. Prac. Cas. 159 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Tooles v. Kellogg Co., 336 F. Supp. 14,
18 (D. Neb. 1972). But see EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir.
1975).
40. See Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1974);
NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Crisler, 491
F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal
World: Equality for the Negra-The Problem of Special Treatment; 61 Nw. U. L
RBV. 363 (1966).
41. See, e.g., Erie Human Relations Commn. v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371, 373 (3d
Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 412-13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939
(1973).
42. See, e.g., NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621 (5th Cir. 1974).
43. See, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civ. Serv. Commn., 482
F.2d 1333, 1341 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354,
377 (8th Cir. 1973).
44. See Delay v. Carling Brewing Co., 10 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 164 (N.D.
Ga. 1975); Watkins v. United States Steelworkers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221
(E.D. La. 1974), affd., 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975). Cf. Meadows v. Ford Motor
Co., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975). But see Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v.
!BEW Local 327, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works
of Intl. Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974). See also Note, Last Hired,
First Fired Layoffs and Title VII, 88 HARv. L. RBv. 1544, 1547-49 (1975).
45. The Supreme Court declined to deal with the issue in DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312 (1974). DeFunis involved the constitutionality of preferential adtnis-
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the problem in a comprehensive fashion. Most courts that have approached the issue have merely cited the Supreme Court's dictum
in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 46 that
"mathematical ratios" may serve as a "useful starting point in shaping a remedy to correct past constitutional violations."47 These
courts have generally been content to emphasize that preferential
remedies are merely temporary48 and that, in the cases where they
are utilized, they are the only realistic means of overcoming the effects of past discrimination.49
This approach has certain advantages-it is concise, yet vague
enough to permit the use of preferential remedies with a minimum
of legal debate. However, one of the difficulties with this approach
is that it is likely to provoke a hostile and often irrational "backlash"
by those persons who are adversely affected by preferences in favor
of Blacks and women. The attitudes and reactions of many members of the academic community provide a good example of this phenomenon. 50 Many minority persons and women perceive academe
as a stronghold of racism and sexism, commanded by white males
under the tattered banners of elitism and tradition. 51 This percepsions to Jaw school. The Court ruled that the issue was moot because DeFunis was
graduating from Jaw school during the term when the opinion was rendered.
46. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
47. 402 U.S. at 25.
48. See Southern ru. Builder's Assn. v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir.
1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 330 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 950 (1972); Local 53, Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1055
(5th Cir. 1969).
49. See Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638,501 F.2d 622, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1974).
so. See H. LlvESEY, THE PROFESSORS-WHO THEY ARE, WHAT THEY Do, WHAT
THEY REALLY WANT AND NEED 309-22 (1975). Although the reaction to "affirmative action" in academe is often hostile, it is nevertheless frequently without
warrant because very little has been achieved pursuant to federally mandated affirmative action plans. In a recent report issued by the United States Comptroller General, it was found that HEW has made but "minimal progress" in making sure that
colleges and universities have acceptable affirmative action programs on employment
and are in compliance with Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1970). The report reveals that, as of Dec. 9, 1974, only 29 colleges and
universities had HEW-approved affirmative action programs. Between 1100 and
1300 colleges and universities are subject to the program and most are required to
have affirmative action plans. The report also indicates that HEW has not consistently sent required "show-cause" notices to colleges and universities whose affirmative action programs are found to be in noncompliance, "nor has it begun sanctions
against these institutions." Government Employee Relations Rep. No. 621, at
B-10, Sept. 1, 1975.
51. This attitude of cynicism is hardly surprising, given situations like the recent
one at The University of Michigan involving Dr. Jewel Cobb. See Washington Post,
May 17, 1975, § 1, at 3, col. 1. Dr. Cobb, who has had a distinguished career as
a teacher, research scholar, and university administrator, was tentatively selected by
the Board of Regents of The University of Michigan to serve as Dean of the College
of Literature, Science, and the Arts. However, within a few days after her selection,
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tion is the result of the persistent exclusion of women and minorities
from teaching and administrative positions at the university level.
Some proponents of the existing system attempt to explain the failures of affirmative action and the failures of universities to hire
minorities and women by claiming that very few "qualified" minority
persons and women are available to fill the existing administrative
and teaching positions in academe. Other individuals who oppose
affirmative action argue that minorities and women are relatively unqualified (as compared with white males), and therefore no special
effort should be made to place them in important jobs within the
academic community. This latter view was appropriately criticized
by commentators Moore and Wagstaff as follows:
Philosopher Charles Frankel goes even further when he says ("Faculty Backlash," 1972, 127): "If you hire unqualified women
[and ,by inference we ,think he also means minorities], bright white
males don't get jobs." Maybe Frankel is right. However, many of
those, like the authors, who challenge the rationale for such a statement believe that ·Frankel would be on sounder ground if he offered
evidence '1:o substantiate the reason for his concern. What is disturbing is his chauvinism. Hiring unqualified persons of either sex and
of any race would result in a number of bright white males, bright
white females, and bright minorities of both sexes not getting as many
of the available positions. Frankel, however, seems only concerned
about "bright white males." 52
Affirmative action is neither an effort to lower the standards of

excellence within the university community (or in any other job situation), nor an effort to promote a concept of "reverse discrimina.:.
tion." 53 Affirmative action is a simple and straight-forward commitment to increase the number of minorities and women in jobs from
which they have been formerly excluded. Affirmative action in general, and preferential remedies in particular, can and does co-exist
with the maintenance of professional standards in job hiring and retention. Once this point is understood, certain legal and moral questhe Zoology Department, without ever having met Dr. Cobb, voted to deny her academic tenure. As a consequence, negotiations were broken off between Dr. Cobb
and the University, and she was never officially app_ointed to the position. A committee of seven faculty persons and one professional administrator at The University
of Michigan subsequen_tly investigated the situation and reported, in part, that the tenure "procedures used to evaluate [Dr. Cobb] were manifestly inadequate." Affirmative Action Comm., Academic Affairs Advisory Council, The University of Michigan, Report on the LS&A Deanship Search, Selection, and Negotiations April 4,
1974-Jan.31, 1975, at 32 (April 25, 1975).
52. W. MOORE & L. WAGSTAFF, BLACK EDUCATORS IN WHITB CoLI.EGES 79
(1974).
53. This is true where "reverse discrimination" is used in a perjorative sense.
The term is also used in a more neutral sense to mean all preferential remedies.
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tions raised in connection with preferential remedies may become
more manageable in the context of traditional constitutional analysis.
Among the most difficult questions that must be answered in reply to those who oppose preferential remedies on constitutional
grounds are (1) under what circumstances should preferential remedies be imposed, (2) by whom should such remedies be imposed,
(3) for how long should such remedies be imposed, (4) what quality
of evidence should be required to sustain the use of a preferential
remedy, and (5) should the standard of scrutiny used to judge the
constitutionality of the imposition of a preferential remedy be less
stringent when the preference is legislatively, as opposed to judicially, mandated. Unfortunately, the courts to date have done little
to respond to these issues; rather, the judicial opinions dealing with
preferential remedies appear to have taken a strictly result-oriented
approach. 5 4 These opinions have often become mired in traditional
constitutional jargon, seemingly in order to reconcile or distinguish
prior holdings of the Supreme Court, and thus frequently obscure
the truly difficult and significant issues raised by preferential remedies. As a consequence, no uniform legal principles or policy imperatives have emerged to lend some enlightened consistency and coherence to these opinions. However, while there is no clear pattern
to the judicial opinions, it is still possible to analyze some of the current judicial thinking and predict the general direction in which the
courts appear to be heading in the area of preferential remedies.
Although it is clear that racial classifications are not unconstitutional per se, 115 they traditionally have been considered suspect and
are generally subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. 156 This means that
if the government wishes to employ a racially based preference, it
must demonstrate that this preference serves a compelling governmental interest and that its use is the least drastic means of accomplishing the desired end. As a practical matter, and as a general
54. See, e.g., United States v. Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973);
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971).
55. E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. J, 11 (1967); Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254, 1257 (3d
Cir. 1970).
56. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). Sex is apparently not a suspect
classification, Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 509 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351, 355 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973) (Powell,
J., concurring), although at least four Justices would treat it as suspect. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 511 (1915) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). At present, therefore, preferences involving sex
classifications may only have to pass the rational basis test. See, e.g. Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). Cf. Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252 '(M.D. Pa.
1973).
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proposition, it may be assumed that any remedy that seeks to achieve
equal employment opportunity among persons of different races will
always serve a compelling governmental interest. 57 However, it is
more difficult to show that there are no less drastic alternative remedies that would break the cycle of discrimination. Although a few
courts have denied preferential remedies on the ground that there
are less drastic means of ending employment discrimination, 58 several courts have implicitly found that some form of preferential remedy is necessary to eliminate the effects of past discrimination, 59 and
at least one court has explicitly stated this conclusion. 60
In NAACP v. Allen, 61 the Fifth Circuit used statistics to demonstrate that a neutral remedy alone was not sufficient to end discrimination. The court noted that an injunction against further race discrimination issued to the Alabama Department of Public Safety had
not resulted in the hiring of a single black state trooper; indeed, the
court found that it was not until the district court ordered preferential
relief, some eighteen months after the original injunction was
ordered, that Blacks were finally hired. 62 The court also noted that,
aside from the obvious effect of providing jobs for black applicants,
the preferential remedy "promptly operates to change the outward
and visible signs of yesterday's racial distinctions and thus, to provide an impetus to the process of dismantling the barriers, psychological or otherwise, erected by past practices." 63 The court thus recognized that breaking both those who discriminate and those who expect to be discriminated against of the "habit'' of racial discrimination is an integral part of the task of ending employment discrimination and that some form of preferential remedy is necessary to break
the discrimination cycle. Similar reasoning will hold true in most
cases where there is a long history of discrimination; in these cases
a preferential remedy should be able to survive strict judicial scrutiny.
51. See, e.g., Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970) (goal of equal opportunity so compelling that school board may not only be permitted, but may be
required, to prefer Blacks in hiring).
58. See, e.g., Harper v. Mayor & City Council, 359 F. Supp. 1187, 1214 (D. Md.),
affd. sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134; 1136 (4th Cir. 1973); Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 306 F. Supp. 1355, 1359-60 (D. Mass.
1969).
59. See Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 631-32 (2d Cir. 1974);
NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Crisler, 491
F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1974).
60. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1974).
61. 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
62. 493 F.2d at 621.
63. 493 F.2d at 621.
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It can be argued, however, that preferential remedies involving
racial or gender-based classifications should be subjected to the less
rigid rational basis test, rather than to strict scrutiny. 64 There are
two related arguments that support this proposal. First, it can be
contended that the strict scrutiny approach was judicially developed
to prevent only those classifications that stigmatize some segment of
society. Although most government classifications tend to favor one
group over another, they are generally used to further neutral policies of convenience or necessity; they do not intend to stigmatize
the disfavored group and they do not have that effect. In such cases,
the government need only show that there is some rational basis for
the classification. Certain classifications, however, tend to have no
legitimate public purpose and involve groups that have traditionally
been disadvantaged in our society. If this is the case, a suspicion
is raised that the classification is based on the same irrational
prejudices that caused the group to be disfavored in the past; accordingly, the classification should be strictly scrutinized. However,
when the classification is benign, favoring an historically disadvantaged group, the suspicion of irrational prejudice against the group
is not present; 65 therefore, the argument concludes, there is no need
to strictly scrutinize such a classification.
Professor Ely has suggested a second and related argument for
applying the rational basis test to benign classifications. 66 When the
dominant group in the legislature acts to its own benefit while disadvantaging a disfavored minority, the classification is suspect and
should be strictly scrutinized. However, when the dominant group
acts to its own detriment while benefiting a minority, the classification is not suspect and need have only a rational basis. Thus, according to Professor Ely, when a white legislature approves a preference that works to the advantage of Blacks and to the detriment of
Whites, there has been no "suspicious" act. It is unlikely that the
dominant group would disadvantage itself in relation to a nondominant group because of any of the irrational reasons that his64. See, e.g., Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U.
L. R.Ev. 723 (1974); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1065, 1107-08 (1969) [hereinafter Developments].
65. The argument is that only those classifications that stigmatize a class should
be suspect. However, it can be argued that even a preference in favor of Blacks stigmatizes them by implying that they could not "make it" without such assistance. See,
e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 343 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). For
a similar argument with respect to women, see Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. R.Ev. 1, 16-23 (1975).
66. Ely, supra note 64. See also Developments, supra note 64, at 1125-26.

CHI.

November 1975]

Preferential Remedies

15

torically led to discrimination against the minority. 67 Similarly, the
dominant group is almost certain to choose the least drastic (to itself) means of benefiting the disadvantaged group. These built-in
safeguards abrogate the need for strict scrutiny, and the rational basis
test provides sufficient assurance of fair treatment for all. 68
It appears that the courts may in fact be distinguishing between
those preferences mandated by the legislature and those ordered by
the courts and scrutinizing benign preferences less strictly when they
originate in the legislature. It may be that the courts find it easier
to accept the use of legislatively authorized preferential remedies because, unlike the judiciary, the legislature is directly accountable to
the voters, who can show their disapproval at the ballot box. While
the exact rationale being utilized is unclear, the opinions do suggest
that something similar to a rational basis test is being applied to benign preferences that have been mandated by the legislature, while
stricter scrutiny is applied when there is no clear legislative mandate.
In Kahn v. Shevin 69 the Supreme Court held that a Florida statute that provided a property tax exemption to widows, but offered
no analogous benefit to widowers, did not violate the equal protection clause. The Court did not consider whether a compelling state
interest was present or less drastic means possible; it required only
a rational basis for the preference. In part, it found this basis by
reasoning that because "the job market is inhospitable to the woman
seeking any but the lowest paid jobs," 70 the state may pass a tax law
"reasonably designed to further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden."71
It could be argued that the rational basis test was applied in Kahn
because sex has not yet been declared a suspect classification by a
majority of the Supreme Court, and therefore that the case is not
a statement about the proper standard for benign preferences.
However, the majority opinion was written by Justice Douglas, who
concurred in the plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson;12 the
plurality in Frontiero found that sex was a suspect classification. This
67. Ely, supra note 64, at 735.
68. If the rational basis test is applied to benign preferences, they should easily
pass constitutional muster since the elimination of the effects of discrimination is certainly a valid governmental interest that benign preferences would conceivably further.
69. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
70. 416 U.S. at 353.
71. 416 U.S. at 355.
72. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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seems to indicate that at least Justice Douglas is willing to use the
rational basis test in considering legislatively declared benign preferences involving otherwise-suspect classifications. 73 The three dissenting Justices in Kahn (Brennan, Marshall, and White) would
seemingly require strict scrutiny even for benign preferences. Pursuant to this view, they argued in Kahn that the state could ease
the financial impact of spousal loss without discriminating between
men and women. 74
Kahn may have been narrowed recently by the Court's opinion
in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld. 75 In Wiesenfeld, the Court found that
the mother's insurance benefits section of the Social Security Act, 76
which provided benefits to the widow of a worker with eligible children in her care but made no corresponding provision for a similarly
situated widower, unjustifiably discriminated against female wage
earners by providing their survivors with less protection than the survivors of male wage earners. The government had argued that the
scheme was "designed to compensate women beneficiaries as a
group for the economic difficulties which still confront women who
seek to support themselves and their families." 77 However, the
Court noted that "the mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry
into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme." 78 The
Court found that in this case the scheme was not based on any special needs of women, but on the premise that women, unlike men,
would want to remain at home with their minor children. The Court
found this premise to be entirely irrational, since either parent might
want to remain at home upon the other's death.
As in Kahn, the challenged statutory scheme drew a sex-based
line, allowing widows a benefit not available to widowers. Yet in
Wiesenfeld, the Court held that the statutory preference could not
meet the rational basis test. This holding may indicate that the
Court intends in the future to scrutinize preferences for women more
carefully. However, the Court may simply have decided that the
73. This interpretation finds support in the means by which Justice Douglas distinguished Kahn from Frontiero. Unlike the statutes in Kahn, Justice Douglas found
that the legislation in Frontiero was "not in any sense designed to rectify the effects
of past discrimination against women." 416 U.S. at 355 n.8, quoting Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 n.22 (1973).
74. 416 U.S. at 357-60 (Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting); 416 U.S. at 360-62
(White, J., dissenting).
75. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1972).
77. 420 U.S. at 648.
78. 420 U.S. at 648.
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classification in Wiesenfeld was not an attempt to aid women disadvantaged in the working world, but represented a perpetuation of
the myth that women want to stay home with their children while
men want to work. If the Court in Wiesenfeld was concerned with
the legislative use of stereotypes, it failed to point out why the basis
of the preference for widows in Kahn was more justifiable than that
in Wiesenfeld. However, the type of preference at issue in both
cases was very different from those preferences at issue in the employment cases. Preferential remedies in the employment area allow minority members and women to work and support themselves
while the preferences at issue in Kahn and Wiesenfeld reinforced
the image of women as the weaker sex. Thus, it is likely that some
proponents of remedial preferences in employment discrimination
cases will oppose the preferences in Kahn and Wiesenfeld. This
opposition, however, goes to the issue whether a preference is actually benign rather than whether benign preferences should be permitted. A preference that has the effect of stigmatizing a class of
people by suggesting that they are incapable of caring for themselves
may not be benign. 79
In both Kahn and Wiesenfeld, the standard of review used to
determine both whether the preference at issue was benign, and
whether it should be permitted was the rational basis test. so In Morton v. Mancari, 81 the Court also seemed to accept the rational basis
test for a benign legislative preference where Indians were the preferred class. In Morton, the Court unanimously upheld the Indian
Preference Statute82 which provides a preference for Indians seeking
employment with the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The Court found
that because the preference was "reasonably designed to further the
cause of Indian self-government and make the BIA more responsive
to the needs of its constituent groups," it was "reasonably and directly related to a legitimate, nonracially based goal."88 Although
19. See note 65 supra.
80. While the Court appeared to use the rational basis test throughout both Kahn
and Wiesenfeld, it is not clear that this is the only approach it could have used. A
court might want to use more than a mere rationality test when determining whether
a preference was actually, as opposed to "conceivably,'' benign. Thus, a statute that
appears benign under the rational basis test might tum out to have invidious aspects
under stricter scrutiny. See, e.g., Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of Health, Educ. &
Welfare, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.NJ. 1973). This raises a fascinating question about
the proper initial approach to "benign" legislation that unfortunately is beyond the
scope of this article.
81. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
82, Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1970),
83, 417 U.S. at 554.
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the Court may have considered the preference nonracially based in
the sense that it encouraged long-run equality, it was clearly racially
based in the sense that Indians were preferred for employment with
the BIA solely because they were Indians.
In considering the Indian preference, the Court did not require
a showing of compelling governmental interest and, although it noted
that the statute was narrowly drawn to include in the preferred class
only those Indians affected by the BIA (that is, those living on or
near reservations), it did not consider whether there were less drastic means of promoting Indian self-government. This could be attributable in part to the Court's reliance on two clauses of the Constitution that seem to single Indians out for special treatment;84 however, it appears that the Court was also influenced by the fact that
it was dealing with a benign preference, aiding a minority group that
historically had been discriminated against.
The rational basis test has also been used in considering the constitutionality of statutes mandating preferences for veterans. These
statutes generally grant persons extra points on competitive civil
service exams solely because -they are veterans. 85 In Feinerman v.
Jones, 86 the district court held that because there is no fundamental
right "to be fairly considered for public employment,"87 the state
may prefer veterans so long as there is a rational basis for the preference. The court postulated three factors that support this rational
basis: military training makes veterans more disciplined, loyal, and
experienced; veterans should be rewarded for serving in the military;
and the preference aids in rehabilitating and relocating veterans
whose lives were disrupted by military service. Because the plaintiff
failed to prove any discriminatory impact, the court rejected the
claim that the preference discriminated against women. Furthermore, the court stated that even if there was such a discriminatory
impact, the statute would still be constitutional because a rational
basis for the preference existed.
Finally, in Porcelli v. Titus, 88 the Third Circuit used a rational
basis test to uphold the abolition of a promotional list being used
by the Newark School Board that tended to perpetuate the low representation of Blacks among school administrators. In order to in84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (power to "regulate Commerce .•. with the
Indian Tribes"); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (power to make treaties).
85. See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. SERv. LAw § 85 (McKinney 1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 38.413 (1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 492.3 (Purdon 1969).
86. 356 F. Supp. 252 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
87. 356 F. Supp. at258.
88. 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970).
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crease the number of Blacks who could be selected as principals or
vice-principals, the court approved the use of race as one criterion
to be used in the selection process. In fact, the court not only found
that the school board was permitted to prefer minority applicants,
but indicated that the board may have had an affirmative duty to
do so in order to integrate school faculties. 89
In each of these cases involving the use of legislatively authorized
preferential treatment, the courts seemed content merely to rubberstamp what they perceived as benign legislative action;90 there was
little or no consideration of the existence of a compelling state interest or a less drastic means. The courts have not required that the
preferences be limited to the end of correcting the effects of past
discrimination, and thus no time limits or goals have been mentioned
that would make the preferences temporary. It appears, therefore,
that the courts may be willing to accept the principle that benign
racial or gender-based classifications, when directly ordered by a legislative body, are not suspect and need not be strictly scrutinized.
There is a hybrid class of preference cases, a cross between legislatively ordered and court ordered preferences, in which either an
administrative agency or a court orders a remedial preference on the
basis of an implied legislative authorization. For example, under
Executive Order 11246,91 the Secretary of Labor is authorized to
promulgate programs that, as a condition for receiving government
contracts, require government contractors to undertake affirmative
action to ensure nondiscriminatory employment. One such program,
the "Philadelphia Plan," required federal contractors to make good
faith efforts to meet specific goals for minority employment in six
construction trades and had the effect of preferring minority applicants over white males. The "Philadelphia Plan" was approved in
Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of
89. 431 F.2d at 1257-58.
90. But see Anderson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist, 357 F. Supp. 248
(N.D. Cal. 1972), where the court overturned a school board's policy of preferring
minority applicants.
91. 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970). See Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 957 (1974); Southern Ill. Builders Assn. v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir.
1972); Contractors Assn. of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d
Cir. 1971). The President is likely to be somewhat less responsive to the public will
than the legislature and somewhat more responsive than the courts. Unlike individual
legislators, the President's constituency is generally very broad and is not likely to
leave him over an individual issue. This gives him more flexibility than the legislature. However, unlike federal judges, the President is elected and must still consider
the wishes of his constituents to some extent Thus, the Executive Order cases seem
to fall somewhere between pure legislative and pure judicial preferences.
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Labor. 92

The court in Contractors emphasized that the plan carefully considered employment trends and industry needs in order to
interfere as little as possible with nonminority workers. 93 In addition, the court noted that the plan was designed only to implement
the participation of minority tradespeople in the construction labor
pool and was shaped to meet the specific problems of the affected
area; thus, it implied that it felt the preference would cease as soon
as these goals were reached. 94
In taking into account the employment needs in the industry and
the temporary nature of the preference, the Contractors court
seemed to indicate that the plan was as narrowly drawn as possible.
However, because the court did not consider whether there was a
less drastic alternative than a preference that would achieve equal
opportunity, it can be inferred that the court was scrutinizing the
preference less strictly than is done in suspect classification cases.
Nevertheless, the scrutiny applied was stricter than in the benign legislative preference cases.
This strict-but-not-too-strict level of scrutiny is also apparent in
the Washington supreme court's analysis in DeFunis v. Odegaard.oil
In that case, the court upheld the University of Washington's preferential admissions program under which minority applicants received
some preference over Whites. The court rejected the argument that
because the racial classification was benign, the rational basis standard of scrutiny should be applied. In its view, because of the disparate effect such classification had on nonminority applicants, a more
rigid standard of scrutiny was required. 96 Using what it considered
strict scrutiny, the court found that a compelling state interest was
served by integrating law schools, acquainting law students with all
segments of society, and increasing the number of minority lawyers.
Furthermore, the court found that a preference for minority students
was the least drastic means of achieving integration in the law
school.97 However, it is significant that the court failed to mention
whether the preferential remedy was limited-that is, whether it
would automatically end when the problem ended. The court also
92. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971).
93. 442 F.2d at 176-77. But see Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), where
the Court approved a legislative preference that was seemingly broader than necessary to accomplish the desired goal.
94. 442 F.2d at 176-77.
95. 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d 1169 (1973), vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312
(1974).
96. 82 Wash. 2d at 32,507 P.2d at 1182.
97. 82 Wash. 2d at 32-35, 507 P.2d at 1182-84.
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failed to make a finding that the law school had historically discriminated against minorities. Because these two factors are generally
considered in court-ordered preference cases, 98 the failure to take
them into account in DeFunis may indicate that the level of scrutiny
was somewhat less rigid.
The less rigid standard of scrutiny applied by the Washington supreme court would seem to be appropriate in a case like DeFunis.
Some legislative approval of the preferential admissions policy can
be inferred from the fact that the legislature continued to appropriate
funds without questioning the policy. Furthermore, professional
schools may be in a better position than either legislatures or courts
to make judgments about preferential admissions programs. The
legislature, as a political body, may find the issue too complex and
politically sensitive to handle efficiently, while the courts have
neither the time nor the expertise to second-guess each admissions
decision. In addition, since there are no objective tests that have
been shown to measure perfectly a student's potential performance
in law school or practice, the school ought to be allowed some m~gin for experimentation in its admissions policy, particularly when
a legitimate social end (such as the training of more minority and
women attorneys) is being served. Finally, the school should be
given some leeway in determining the goals of its admissions policy.
For example, some law schools might choose students based on their
potential for becoming outstanding legal scholars, while other schobls
might value more highly the potential for becoming a successful local
practitioner; similarly some schools might prefer foreign over American applicants in selecting persons for graduate law study or graduat(?
fellowships. Few people have questioned the advisability of allowing law schools leeway in deciding such questions, even though a
class of potential students might be excluded by the policies adopted.
Thus, if the school perceives a need to bring more minority or
women students into the profession, it is at least arguable that it
should be permitted to do so.
It can be legitimately contended that if too much discretion is
given to nonlegislative agencies such as law schools, these agencies
may be able to employ malign as well as benign preferences. This
can be prevented, however, by requiring the agency to justify its
"hiring" goals as was done in DeFunis. In other words, although
the agency should be allowed considerable discretion, it would of
course be limited by statutory or constitutional constraints against invidious discrimination. •
98. See text at notes 164-66, 178 i,cfra.
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When DeFunis reached the Supreme Court, the Court found the
case to be moot and refused to rule on the controversial preference. 99 Justice Douglas dissented from the finding of mootness and
indicated that, although he would be willing to give school officials
considerable discretion in admissions decisions, he would not uphold
a policy that gave some applicants a preference based solely on their
race. Justice Douglas called for a very strict standard of review and
implied that he would not favor preferential treatment for minority
applicants.
Justice Douglas' dissent in DeFunis wou1d seem to clash directly
with his opinion in Kahn v. Shevin. Although Douglas did not attempt to reconcile the opinions,100 two factors may have influenced
the conflicting results. First, in Kahn there was a clear legislative
mandate for the preference, while in DeFunis the mandate was more
vague and uncertain. Justice Douglas may have been more willing
to defer to the judgment of a legislature than the decisions of a quasiadministrative body. Second, and probably more persuasive, in DeFunis the preference was benign toward minority applicants but it
was malign toward white applicants-white applicants were directly
and adversely affected by the preference. In Kahn, however, any
adverse effect on males was less direct, and in fact, the burden of
the preference was spread over most of the taxpaying population of
the state, both male and female. Justice Douglas thus may have
been willing to allow a preference only when no clearly defined
group is directly and adversely affected by the benefit granted to the
preferred group. 101
This reasoning, however, would seem to conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in Morton v. Mancari. In that case, nonIndian applicants were directly disadvantaged by the Indian preference. The Court's reliance, at least in part, on those sections of the
Constitution that seem to give Indians some special status may account for Justice Douglas' different attitude toward the preference
in Morton. Nevertheless, these conflicting decisions seem to indicate that Justice Douglas would have strictly scrutinized a preference
that is not mandated by the legislature and that adversely affects a
99. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). DeFunis was admitted to law
school pursuant to the order of the trial court, which had found in his favor. Since
the parties had agreed that regardless of the outcome of the case DeFunis would be
allowed to graduate, the Court found the case to be moot. 316 U.S. at 316-20.
100. DeFunis was decided on April 23, 1974. 416 U.S. at 312. Kahn was decided the following day. 416 U.S. at 351.
101. Compare Wiesenfeld, where one group of women (those working and making Social Security payments) were directly and adversely affected by a preference
designed to compensate another group of women. See text at notes 75-78 supra.
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particular group, while he would have been more likely to use the
rational basis test in cases involving a legislatively mandated preference, especially if the preference spreads any accompanying burden
widely over the population.
The strictest judicial scrutiny seems to be applied in cases in
which the courts order preferences without any explicit legislative
mandate. For example, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
of Education, 102 the Court held that "mathematical ratios" are "useful starting point[s] in shaping a remedy" 103 for unconstitutional
segregation of students and faculty in a school district. However,
the Court noted that the use of ratios is not to be ordered lightly,
and that here the district court had found both a history of segregation and failure by the school board to propose workable alternative
means of integrating the schools.10{ The Court emphasized that the
ratio is only a starting point and that there is no constitutional right
to a fixed racial balance in every school equal to that in the school
system as a whole. 105
The Swann case is only one in a long line of cases seeking to
enforce the constitutional right to attend integrated schools. 106 Although state-imposed school segregation was declared unconstitutional almost seventeen years before Swann, deliberate resistance on
the part of many school boards impeded the effort to enforce the
constitutional guarantee. 107 The Court realized in Swann that colorblind remedies could not effectively eliminate segregation and that
affirmative relief was necessary. When a school board defaults on
its obligation to integrate the schools, the courts have a duty to order
such relief (including that based on ratios) as is necessary to end
the pattern of segregation.
The Court approved the use of ratios in faculty assignments in
United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education,1° 8 in
which the Court recognized that the ratios would be necessary in
order to assure that faculties would be integrated with the greatest
possible speed. While this case did not involve hiring and firing,
it nevertheless involved the use of color in the employment-related
102. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
103. 402 U.S. at 25.
104. 402 U.S. at 24.
105. 402 U.S. at 23-24.
106. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225,
228 (1969).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225,
228 (1969).
108. 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
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decision concerning where the teachers' work would be done. It
therefore forms a bridge between the school desegregation and employment cases.
In the school desegregation cases, both the compelling governmental interest in integration and the absence of workable, less drastic means are well documented, making it easy for the Supreme
Court to apply strict scrutiny to desegregation orders and yet allow
the lower courts a great deal of discretion. 109 Court-ordered preferential remedies in the absence of explicit legislative mandate have
also been used in the employment context under the Civil Rights
Acts of 1866110 and 1871,111 but the strict scrutiny applied in these
cases requires an individual finding that a compelling governmental
interest is served and no less drastic means are available. For instance, in NAACP v. Allen, the court approved a one-Black-to-oneWhite hiring ratio to be in effect until twenty-five per cent of the
Alabama state troopers and support personnel were Black. Although the court appeared willing to assume that there was a compelling governmental interest in providing equal opportunity to be hired
for these jobs,112 it emphasized that there was no less restrictive
means of achieving the goal and stressed that by making the order
temporary, the district court had imposed the most narrowly drawn
remedy possible to accomplish the purpose.118
These decisions suggest that there may be a continuum in the
level of scrutiny accorded a preferential remedy that depends on the
degree of legislative approval of that remedy. Scrutiny seems to be
most lenient when there is an explicit legislative mandate. When
the mandate is only implied, the scrutiny is more strict, and it intensifies as the implication becomes less clear. The strictest scrutiny is
applied when there is not even an implied legislative mandate. This
strictness manifests itself in the degree to which the courts require
a consideration of both alternative means and limits on the duration
of the remedy. In the employment context, where there are at most
only implied legislative mandates for preferential remedies, this
means that to withstand constitutional attack, a preferential remedy
must be found to be the least drastic means of remedying discrimina109.
(1971);
(1969).
110.
111.
112.
remedy,
113.

See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 11-12
United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 226

42 u.s.c. § 1981 (1970).
42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1970).
The defendants had, however, objected on appeal only to the affirmative
not to the finding of a duty not to discriminate. See 493 F.2d at 617.
493 F.2d at 621.
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tion in the particular situation, must be drawn narrowly enough to
limit its effect to remedying past discrimination, and must automatically terminate when the goal is accomplished. These limitations
assure that the volatile remedy will be used sparingly.114 Since only
carefully circumscribed preferences are likely to receive judicial approval, the furor over preferential remedies in the employment context is based on a misconception of the power and inclination of the
courts to so affect the employment relationship.

ill.

THE Ex!STING LEGISLATION ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964115 makes it an unlawful
employment practice to discriminate against any individual on the
basis of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.116 When a violation of the Act is found, the district court may,
inter alia, "order such affirmative action . • • or any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate." 117 However, section 703G)
of the Act forbids the use of preferential treatment to remedy an
imbalance between minority and nonminority employees.U 8
Notwithstanding section 703G), a number of courts have found
that preferential treatment may be an acceptable remedy for a violation of title VII when there is a history of discrimination, whether
the discrimination was intentional119 or de facto. 120 While some of
114. There are good reasons why the use of racial criteria should be strictly
scrutinized and given legal sanction only where a compelling need for remedial
action can be shown. Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d
920, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1969). Government recognition and sanction of racial
classifications may be inherently divisive, reinforcing prejudices, confirming perceived differences between the races, and weakening the government's educative
role on behalf of equality and neutrality. It may ali1,o have unexpected results,
such as the development of indicia for placing individuals into different racial
categories. Once racial classifications are imbedded in the law, their purpose
may become perverted: a benign preference under certain con'iiitions may shade
into a malignant preference at other times. Moreover, a -racial preference for
members of one minority might result in discrimination against another minority, a higher proportion of whose members bad previously enjoyed access to a
certain opportunity.
Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9, 17-18 (1st Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to -17 (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973 ).
116. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-2 (1970).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. III, 1973).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Masonry Contractors Assn. of Memphis, Inc., 497
F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1974); Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir.
1974); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Lathers Local 46,471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. lronworkers Local 86,443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971).
120. See, e.g., NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1028 (1st Cir. 1974); United
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these opinions fail to mention section 703(j),121 others reason that
the section was not intended to prohibit the use of a preferential
remedy where an imbalance is a result of past unlawful discrimination. This is so, say these courts, since it "would allow complete
nullification" of the statute to eliminate as a possible remedy what
is often the only effective means of overcoming past discrimination.122
Thus far, it appears that only two courts of appeals have approved actual hiring preferences for minority employees under title
VII. Finding a history of discrimination in the promotion of foremen, the court in United States v. N. L. Industries, Inc., 123 ordered
a one-Black-to-one-White hiring ratio until fifteen Blacks (out of one
hundred positions) were promoted. However, the court rejected a
government request for a recruiting campaign designed to effect a
goal of one-third black hires into office, clerical, and technical positions notwithstanding that there was a history of discrimination in
that area. Similarly, in EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co.,124 the court
upheld the use of hiring ratios where the district court had found
a long history of discrimination against black job applicants and employees by both the company and the unions involved. The other
decisions by courts of appeals under title VII in which preferences
have been ordered have usually involved preferences for union
membership or referrals. 125 -However, these may be tantamount to
job preferences since employers in certain private industries give
preference to union members over nonmembers in hiring and placement.126
States v. IBEW Local 212,472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Carpenters
Local 169, 457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. !BEW Local 38, 428 F.2d
144 (6th Cir. 1970); Local 53, Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047
(5th Cir. 1969).
121. E.g., EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Masonry Contractors Assn., 498 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1974); United States
v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Carpenters
Local 169,457 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1972).
122. See Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 631 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 413 (2d Cir. 1973); United States
v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 552-54 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v.
IBEW Local 38, 428 F.2d 144, 149-50 (6th Cir. 1970); Local 53, Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1054 (5th Cir. 1969).
123. 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973).
124. 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975).
125. See cases cited in notes 119-20 supra.
126. See United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210, 219 (7th Cir.
1972) ("Where, as here, the union members refuse to work with nonmembers who
are working without union approval, the union in fact exerts effective control over
employment in the trade by controlling membership and issuance of permits, notwithstanding contractual provisions purportedly permitting employment without regard for
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Notwithstanding section 703G), there is an implied legislative
mandate for the use of preferential remedies under title VII. Section 703G) was added to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a compromise measure to emphasize that the Act would not require employers
to achieve or maintain specific racial balances through the use of
preferential treatment. However, at no point in the consideration
of the Act did the sponsors indicate that temporary preferential remedies could not be used to overcome the effects of past discrimination.127 In considering the 1972 amendments to the Act, Congress
impliedly recognized the importance of preferential ,remedies by rejecting a number of proposed amendments that would have eliminated their use. Senator Javits, one of the sponsors of the bill, in
arguing against an amendment that would have enjoined all federal
officials from requiring preferential remedies, pointed out that the
amendment would not only eliminate an important judicial remedy
for employment discrimination, but would also preclude effective
consent decrees and affirmative action under Executive Order
11246.128 The Senate rejected the proposed amendment, thereby
implying its approval of preferential remedies as employed by the
courts.129
Despite this implied legislative approval, the courts have continued to subject preferential remedies in title VII cases to very strict
judicial scrutiny,180 similar to that applied in the court-ordered preference cases. 181 This can be attributed to two factors. First, although section 703G) has not been interpreted to ban all preferential remedies, 182 the section may indicate that Congress was concerned about the possibility of abuse of such remedies; therefore
union membership or approval"); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d
544, 547 (9th Cir. 1971); Local 53, Heat & Frost Insulators v. Vogler, 407 F.2d
1047, 1049 (5th Cir. 1969).
127. The sponsors did indicate that title VII would not require the maintenance
of a racial balance, see, e.g., 110 CONG. REc. 12,723 (1964) (remarks of Senator
Humphrey); 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964) (memorandum by Senators Clark and
Case), but that is quite different from a temporary preferential remedy used solely
to overcome the effects of past discrimination.
128. See 118 CONG. REc. 1664 (1972). See also 118 CONG. REC. 1661-76
(1972); 118 CONG. REc. 4917-18 (1972).
129. Since Congress specifically considered the issue of preferential treatment and
refused to eliminate its use as a remedy under title VII, the refusal is at least some
evidence of its approval of court interpretations. See Laycock v. Kenney, 270 F.2d
580 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 933 (1960). Cf. Flood v. Kuhn, 407
U.S. 258 (1972).
130. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Lathers Local 46,471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973).
131. See text at notes 45-114 supra.
132. See text at notes 119-22 supra.
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courts may feel that they should not be ordered lightly. Second,
Congress has neither affirmatively approved such remedies nor defined the situations in which it might consider their use proper.
Preferential treatment is a volatile remedy, and without any specific
guidance from the legislature, it is reasonable that the courts would
carefully limit the use of these remedies under title VII.
Employment discrimination is also proscribed by the Civil Rights
Acts of 1866183 and 1871.134 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, now
42 U.S.C. § 1981, has recently been interpreted to provide a remedy
for private acts of employment discrimination. 185 This section is
narrower than title VII in that it only applies to race discrimination
cases, but it is also broader in that it applies to employers who cannot be reached under title VII. 136 In addition, some of the procedural requirements of title VII, particularly the time-consuming
and cumbersome investigation and conciliation procedures, may be
avoided under section 1981.187 Finally, the relevant state statute
of limitations is applied to section 1981 actions, allowing some actions that might otherwise be foreclosed by the statute of limitations
contained in ·title VII. 138
The Civil Rights Act of 1871, now 42 U.S.C. § 1983, proscribes
any deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state authority
and has been interperted to provide a remedy for public sector employment discrimination based on race, sex, or national origin. 180
Since, unlike section 1981, section 1983 requires that state action
be shown, it does not cover most discrimination in the private sector.
As under section 1981, some of the procedural requirements of title
133. 42 u.s.c. § 1981 (1970).
134. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1970).
135. See, e.g., Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir.
1971); Young v. IT&T, 438 F.2d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1971). See also Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
136. For instance, title VII excludes employers of fewer than fifteen employees,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (Supp. ill, 1973), the federal government, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(b) (1) (Supp. ill, 1973), private membership clubs, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(2) (Supp.
III, 1973), and religious associations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (Supp. III, 1973).
131. See, e.g., Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir.
1971); Young v. IT&T, 438 F.2d 757, 761-64 (3d Cir. 1971); Larson, The Develop•
ment of Section 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private Employment,
7 HARV. CIV. RlGHTS-C!v. LIB. L. REV. 56, 68-74 (1972).
138. E.g., Young v. IT&T, 438 F.2d 757, 763 (3d Cir. 1971); Boudreaux v. Baton
Rouge Marine Contracting Co., 437 F.2d 1011, 1017 n.16 (5th Cir. 1971); Larson,
supra note 137, at 76-83.
139. See, e.g., Erie Human Relations Commn. v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir.
1974); Vulcan Soc. of the N.Y.C. Fire Dept., Inc. v. Civil Serv. Commn., 490
F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civ. Serv.
Commn., 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d
Cir. 1973) (en bane).
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VIl can be avoided in a section 1983 suit, and the state statute of
limitations is applied. 140
Neither section 1981 nor section 1983 contains any explicit legislative mandate for ordering preferential remedies. Nevertheless,
both statutes have been interpreted to permit,141 and perhaps to require, 142 preferential remedies when there is an intentional143 or de
facto144 history of employment discrimination. A very strict standard of review is applied, and a preferential remedy is allowed only
when there are no alternative means of overcoming the effects of discrimination and only for a period sufficient to break the pattern of
discrimination. Although some concern has been expressed in the
opinions for the problem of reverse discrimination, the courts seem
to have accepted narrowly drawn preferential remedies145 as necessary to end discrimination.
The necessity for affirmative action to end discrimination has also
been recognized under Executive Order 11246,146 which prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
and national origin by all contractors and subcontractors engaged in
federal and federally assisted construction projects. It has been interpreted to require preferential treatment as a condition to the
award of government contracts when minorities or women are being
140. See, e.g., Madison v. Wood, 410 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1969); Henig v. Odorioso, 385 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1016 (1968).
141. See, e.g., NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Erie Human Relations Commn. v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir. 1974); Vulcan Soc. of the
N.Y.C. Fire Dept., Inc. v. Civil Serv. Commn., 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civ. Serv. Commn., 482 F.2d 1333, 1340-41 (2d
Cir. 1973); Pennsylvania v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973) (en bane);
Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725 (1st Cir. 1972); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315
(8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). But see Harper v. Mayor &
City Council, 359 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Md.), atfd. sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486
F.2d 1134, 1136-37 ( 4th Cir. 1973).
142. See Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1974).
143. See, e.g., Erie Human Relations Commn. v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir.
1974).
144. See, e.g., Vulcan Soc. of the N.Y.C. Fire Dept., Inc. v. Civil Serv. Commn.,
490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973); Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970).
145. For instance, in NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 621 (5th Cir. 1974), the
court stated:
[Quota relief] is a temporary remedy that seeks to spend itself as promptly as
it can by creating a climate in which objective, neutral employment criteria can
successfully operate to select public employees solely on the basis of job related
merit . • . • It is a form of relief which should be reserved for those situations
in which less restrictive means have failed or in which the chancellor could reasonably foresee that they would fail.
See Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 330-31 (8th Cir. 1972) (absolute preference
modified to one-to-two ratio to reduce infringement on nonminority group applicants).
146. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V, 1970).
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"underutilized" by the contractor or when there are discriminatory
barriers to equal opp,ortunity.147 Under this order, a number of local
plans requiring good faith efforts to reach set goals for minority hiring have been instituted,148 but unlike the title VII preferences, the
plans have been largely ineffective.140 This may be due in part to
the establishment of unrealistically high goals, which contractors frequently fail to reach. 150 Also, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) seems reluctant to implement the available sanctions, such as cancelling contracts or debarring offenders from future
federal contracts; it prefers instead to enter into compromises that
tend to water down the plans. 151 Nevertheless, the programs have
received judicial approval in a number of cases152 and seem to have
had some effect on minority hiring and public recognition of the
problem.
The Executive Order received implied legislative approval during the consideration of the 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. In the debates over a proposed amendment designed
to eliminate preferential treatment, Senator Javits read Contractors
Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor158 into the
record, and the rejection of the proposed amendment arguably implies acceptance of the reasoning of that case.
Programs under Executive Order 11246 are specifically designed
to minimize the problem of reverse discrimination. Before affirmative action plans are established, such factors as the availability of
minorities and women for employment, whether those who are available have the requisite skills, and the existence of training programs,
147. Guidelines to this effect have been issued by the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-2.1 to .32 (1974). The guidelines apply to each
nonconstruction prime or subcontractor who has 50 or more employees and a contract of $50,000 or more. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.40,_ -2.1 (1974). See generally Nash,
Affirmative Action Under Executive Order 11,246, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 225 (1971 ).
148. See generally 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-5.1 to .30 (Washington Plan), -6.1 to .30
(San Francisco Plan), -7.1 to .30 (St. Louis Plan), -8.1 to .30 (Atlanta Plan), -10.1
to .30 (Camden Plan), -11.1 to .23 (Chicago Plan) (1974).
149. See, e.g., Donegan, The Philadelphia Plan: A Viable Means of Achieving
Equal Opportunity in the Construction Industry or More Pie in the Sky?, 20 KAN.
L. RBv. 195 (1972); Jones, Federal Contract Compliance in Phase II-The Dawning
of the Age of Enforcement of Equal Employment Obligations, 4 GA. L. REV. 756
(1970).
150. See, e.g., Donegan, supra note 149, at 210.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d
9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); Southern Ill. Builders Assn. v.
Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972); Contractors Assn. of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary
of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971).
153. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971).
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are to be considered.154 When dealing with the construction industry, the OFCC has encouraged labor, management, and the minority
community in certain geographic localities to develop and agree
upon an acceptable "hometown" affirmative action plan that, when
approved by the OFCC, will prevent the imposition of a mandatory
plan.11111
Thus, preferential remedies have been recognized and enforced
pursuant to title VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, and Executive Order 11246. Whether or not the Supreme Court ultimately rules that quota or preferential remedies
under title VII are barred by section 703G), the issue may be moot
from a practical standpoint. First, preferential remedies are available in race discrimination cases under the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
now section 1981. Second, preferential remedies are also available
in the public sector under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now section
1983, in cases involving race, sex, and national origin employment
discrimination. 156 The most significant group of cases in which no
preferential remedy could be granted if title VII is construed to forbid the use of such remedies, would be sex discrimination claims in
the private sector. However, there is no logical reason to differentiate between these cases.157 By using title VII cases as support
for preferential remedies in cases based on Executive Order 11246
and sections 1981 and 1983 (and vice versa), a number of judicial
opinions have already suggested that the cases should be treated in
a similar manner. 158 It therefore appears that although the Supreme
Court has yet to rule on the issue, the Senate debates and the overwhelming majority of lower court decisions support the conclusion
that preferential remedies, in one form or another, are permissible
under all of the existing laws regulating employment practices in the
United States.

JV.

THE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES:

A SEARCH FOR SOME UNIFYING PRINCIPLES
As noted above, 159 it has been argued that preferential remedies
154. See 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-2.11 to .12 (1974); Nash, supra note 147, at 231.
155. Nash, supra note 147, at 245-49.
156. There is also some authority suggesting that the coverage of section 1981
includes claims of race discrimination brought by white as well as black persons.
See WRMA Broadcasting Co. v. Hawthorne, 365 F. Supp. 577 (M.D. Ala. 1973).
157. See Watkins v. United Steelworkers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221, 1230-31
(E.D. La. 1974).
158. See, e.g., Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 329 (8th Cir. 1971); Contractors
Assn. of Eastern Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 172 (3d Cir. 1971).
159. See text at and following note 101 supra.
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may be permissible, but only when one race or sex is not deprived
of a benefit by virtue of a preference given to another. Quotas are
acceptable, the argument runs, to achieve school integration since
everyone gets a seat in a classroom, but they are unacceptable in
the employment context because the preferred ·hiring of a minority
person usually disadvantages a nonminority person.160 This argument is particularly powerful in a period of economic recession when
there are not enough jobs to go around. 161 The use of remedial
quotas and preferences under these conditions could increase racial
tension so much that it would outweigh any benefit from the hiring
of minority people.162 Because of this potentially detrimental effect,
and because the courts apply rigid scrutiny in preference cases,168
the courts have imposed substantial limitations on preference orders.
The purpose of ordering preferential treatment in the employment context is to overcome the effects of past discrimination, not
to mandate specific proportions of each race and sex that must be
employed.164 Once the effects of past discrimination are eliminated,
the employer may be enjoined from renewing his discriminatory
practices, but affirmative orders should cease and the employer
should no longer be bound by quotas or percentage goals. Virtually
every court that has ordered preferential treatment has recognized
this, and the orders have been formulated to run either for a specific,
limited period of time165 or until a specific, limited percentage or
numerical goal is achieved. 166 The goals must be set so that the
employer can meet them without hiring unqualified persons, as a
preferential remedy should never force an employer to hire someone who is not otherwise qualified or qualifiable but for his or her
160. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 30, 507 P.2d 1169, 1181 (1973),
vacated as moot, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
161. See generally Watkins v. United Steelworkers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221
(E.D. La. 1974); Bender, Job Discrimination, 10 Years Later, N.Y. T1111es, Nov. 10,
1974, § 3, at 1, col. 1; Note, supra note 44, at 1547-49; NEWSWEEK, Dec. 2, 1974,
at 72. Cf. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. IBEW Local 327, 508 F.2d 687 (3d
Cir. 1975); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Intl. Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309
(7th Cir. 1974 ).
162. See, e.g., Detroit Free Press, May 10, 1975, § A, at 1, cots. 7-8; id., May
11, 1975, § A. at 1, cot. 3; id., May 15, 1975, § A, at 1, cots. 7-8 (court order prohibiting layoff of certain minority patrolmen led to bitter racial dispute on Detroit
police force).
163. See text at notes 91-114 supra.
164. NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614,621 (5th Cir. 1974).
165. See, e.g., United States v. Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 413 (2d Cir.
1973).
166. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974) (percentage goal); Erie Human Relations Commn. v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir.
1974) (numerical goal).
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race or sex. Rather, it should force the employer to hire people who
have not been hired because of their race or sex.
In determining the proper limit or goal for a preferential remedy,
the courts have considered a number of factors. First, some courts
have considered the availability of qualified minority people in the
geographic area constituting the job market. 167 The appropriate
geographic area is usually defined as the area from which the em•
ployer or union has traditionally drawn its employees or members.168
However, if the traditional job market suggested by the employer
or union is unreasonably narrow and therefore excludes a potential
pool of minority or women workers, the court may look at a wider
region in determining the employment goal.169 The goal is typically
based on the percentage of minority people in the appropriate job
market who could have been employed by the company but for the
prior discrimination.170
Second, the courts consider the effect that a preferential remedy
will have on the company or industry involved and on white male
workers. To the extent that any dislocation can be minimized, the
courts try to do so. 171
Finally, the availability of training programs for job applicants
is considered in determining the preferential goal. The courts do
not always require that potential applicants be qualified to do the
work immediately, and it is often held sufficient that the pool of ap•
plicants be capable of learning the job in a reasonable period of time
if that is what was generally required by the company. In such
cases, the courts have ordered preferences for training programs as
well as for hiring. 172
The availability of training programs is particularly important in
cases where employment tests have been invalidated and it has not
been possible to develop a valid test. In Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.,178 the Supreme Court held that an employment test may not
167. See, e.g., Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87, 111, 122 (E.D.
Mich. 1973), revd. on other grounds sub nom. EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515
F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364
(5th Cir. 1974).
168. Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 632 (2d Cit. 1974).
169. Cf. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
170. Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1974).
171. See, e.g., Erie Human Relations Commn. v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371, 375 (3d
Cir. 1974).
172. See Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 626 (2d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210, 216 (7th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Ironworkers Local 86,443 F.2d 544, 552-54 (9th Cir. 1971).
173. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The court recently elaborated upon the standards for
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be used by an employer if it is shown to have an adverse impact
on a protected class and it is not shown to be job related. This twofold standard may be difficult to meet; thus, some employers have
found themselves forced to discard invalid tests and unable to develop valid ones. ·In such cases, the employer may not only be required to grant preferential treatment to minority persons to overcome the effects of past discrimination, but may also be implicitly
required to train them (and others) to perform the job. 174 This
does not mean that an employer will be forced to hire unqualified
persons, as an invalid test cannot accurately predict job performance.
For the same reason, a person cannot legitimately claim to be a victim of reverse discrimination merely because he or she was not hired
after receiving a high score on an invalid employment test. This
point is often lost in the furor over reverse discrimination.
Preferential remedies only require that the preference be
granted to qualified persons and generally assume that all persons
within the pool of qualified applicants have equal ability. It would
be difficult to rationalize the granting of preferences if a company
were able to show that its applicants were not equal. Therefore,
the question arises whether an employer may avoid the effect of a
preferential remedy by "rank ordering" job applicants pursuant to
an employment test or some other objective criterion. Several courts
have indicated that an employer is entitled to hire the "best qualified" person for a position. 175 Also, the HEW Office for Civil Rights
has recently .declared that a college or university may, under title
IX, hire the "best qualified" person for a position and that the legal
commitment of "affirmative action" merely requires the university
to act in good faith in an effort to recruit minority persons and
women. 176 Although no case has been found in which rank ordering
has been permitted, the "best qualified" cases make it at least theoretically possible that employers would be permitted to rank order
applicants from best to least qualified.
The problem with rank ordering is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to develop a test that can rank order applicants with any degree
test validation in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 43 U.S.L.W. 4880 (U.S. June 25,
1915).
174. Even when the employer can develop a valid employment test, the court
may, as a further remedy against past discrimination, require the employer to offer
pre-test tutoring to help minority persons prepare for the tests. See, e.g., Carter v.
Galla~er, 452 F.2d 315, 319, 326 (8th Cir. 1971).
115. See United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 448 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); Wilson v. Woodward Iron Co., 362 F.
Supp. 886, 894 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
176. HEW, Memorandum to College and University Presidents, Dec., 1974.
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of certainty, and an unvalidated test would presumably fail to satisfy
the requirement of a "professionally developed ability test" under
section 703(h) of title_VII. 177 If rank ordering could pass muster
under section 703(h), it would obviously tend to dilute the preferential remedy. This latter issue has generally been avoided by finding
that the qualifying examination used was invalid and therefore could
not legitimately rank applicants.
Normally, before a preferential remedy is ordered there is a finding of a history of discrimination against a protected group and a
finding that other available relief would be inadequate to overcome
the present effects of the discrimination.178 It is not necessary to
show that an employer or- union intentionally discriminated against
minorities or women; a history of de facto discrimination, the results
of which are being perpetuated, is sufficient to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination warranting a preferential remedy. 179 A
history of discrimination may be inferred from statistics that show
a long-term disparity between the percentage of minority workers
available in the job market and the percentage of minority workers
employed.180 Generally, however, there is also nonstatistical evidence of past and present discrimination: for example, the use of
discriminatory criteria (such as nepotism in an all-White union), the
use of subjective criteria -that are shown to statistically favor white
males (such as supervisor recommendations where supervisors tend
to recommend only Whites), the use of unvalidated employment
tests, and specific instances of overt discrimination. 181 In fact, although statistical evidence alone has been found to be sufficient to
177. 42 U.S.C. § 20-00e-2(h) (1970). Cf. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,
327-31 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing the problems involved in using
the LSAT to "rank order" law school applicants).
178. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 631-32 (2d Cir.
1974); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1974); Morrow v. Crisler,
491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1974); Harper v. Mayor & City Council, 359 F. Supp.
1187, 1214 (D. Md.), affd. sub nom. Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir.
1973); Arrington v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 306 F. Supp. 1355, 1359-60
(D. Mass. 1969).
179. Erie Human Relations Commn. v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371, 373-74 (3d Cir.
1974).
180. Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civ. Serv. Commn., 482 F.2d 1333,
1335 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 550 (9th
Cir. 1971). See generally Piss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm.
L REv. 235, 270-73 (1971).
181. See, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civ. Serv. Commn., 482
F.2d 1333, 1335-39 (2d Cir. 1973) (unvalidated test); United States v. N.L Indus.,
Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 369 (8th Cir. 1973) (subjective criteria; specific instances
of discrimination); United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210, 215, 220
(7th Cir. 1972) (nepotism; subjective criteria; specific instances of discrimination).
The list of indicators of discrimination is, of course, illustrative, not exhaustive.

36

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 74:1

support a finding of discrimination, 182 research has not disclosed any
decisions ordering a preferential remedy upon only a statistical showing of discrimination. This is reasonable since the courts are dealing with strong medicine in preferential remedies and before prescribing this treatment should be quite sure that the disease, discrimination, is present.183
A statistical showing of discrimination, even when there is additional nonstatistical evidence, only establishes a prima facie case of
discrimination. The burdens of going forward and of persuasion
then shift to the employer, who may justify the disparity on legitimate "business necessity" grounds such as the unavailability of minority workers with necessary skills.184 Even if the employer cannot
rebut the inference that he has engaged in discrimination, he may
be able to avoid the imposition of a preferential remedy by showing
that he has made good faith185 but unsuccessful efforts to recruit
minority persons or women; this rebuttal is reasonable since an employer should not be required to adhere to an unrealistic ratio or
goal.
In addition to the above considerations, several other factors have
apparently influenced the courts to grant or withhold preferential
remedies in cases of employment discrimination. Curiously, the nature of the work involved may influence a court's decision whether
to mandate a preferential remedy. This tentative conclusion may
be drawn from the fact that every decision granting a preferential
remedy has involved blue-collar jobs. While very few cases have
been brought concerning white-collar or professional jobs, the courts
that have had an opportunity to issue preferential orders dealing with
these jobs have avoided doing so. For example, in United States v.
N. L. lndustries, 186 preferential relief was ordered for the promotion
of plant foremen but denied for the hiring of white-collar workers.
The court gave no convincing reason for granting a more effective
remedy for the promotion of a handful of foremen than for the initial hiring of a large number of white-collar workers.
182. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421,426 (8th Cir. 1970).
183. See generally Fiss, supra note 180, at 268-81.
184. E.g., Vulcan Soc. of the N.Y.C. Fire Dept. v. Civil Serv. Commn., 490
F.2d 387, 393 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Carpenters Local 169, 457 F.2d 210,
214 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (9th
Cir. 1971). Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973 ); Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
·
185. Resistance to affirmative action measures other than preferences has been
considered a good reason to order preferences. See, e.g., Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d
1053 (5th Cir. 1974).
186. 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973).
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Similarly, in Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co.,187 after finding a long
history of discrimination on the part of Detroit Edison, the court
ordered the use of specific hiring ratios for blue-collar jobs and mandated a general thirty per cent employment goal for Blacks in the
company. Thus, while a relatively effective ratio remedy was
granted for blue-collar workers, no substantial remedy was granted
for white-collar discrimination: the company could meet its thirty
per cent over-all goal without hiring Blacks for white-collar jobs. As
in N. L. Industries, no reason was given for this difference in treatment.
Research has disclosed no decisions granting a preferential remedy for white-collar employees. One explanation for this may be
that the courts are simply wary -of breaking new ground with a controversial remedy. Another explanation may be that judges perceive
some unstated distinctions between white- and blue-collar jobs that
make them reluctant to compel hiring on the basis of race or sex
for the former jobs. It is sometimes claimed, for example, that it
is more difficult to measure performance in white-collar jobs by objective standards because these jobs involve the exercise of judgment
and a closer rapport with co-workers. The courts may assume that
this is so and feel that they lack the competence to judge workers'
abilities in these jobs; therefore they may be unwilling to intrude
too far on an employer's discretion in hiring white-collar workers.
Whatever the reasons for the apparent difference in judicial
treatment of white- and blue-collar jobs, there does not appear to be
any legitimate justification for this distinction. First, many whitecollar jobs involve work performance that can be measured by objective standards and many do not involve significant skill requirements. Second, criteri.a by which the courts determine whether to
grant preferential remedies for blue-collar jobs can be used in all
cases. The strict scrutiny applied by the courts in these cases would
protect against unreasonable or unworkable preferential remedies.
Finally, many white-collar jobs are generally regarded as preferred
work, and these are precisely the jobs from which Blacks and women
have traditionally been excluded. If the courts fail to use preferential remedies in these important cases, it will be a long time before
the general goal of ending discrimination will be achieved.
It is also interesting that virtually every case in which preferential remedies have been granted has involved race or national origin
discrimination. Sex discrimination has rarely been considered as
187. 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973), revd. on other grounds sub nom. EEOC
v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975).
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grounds for a preferential remedy. Since there appears to be no
basis for distinguishing between the treatment of minorities and
women under title VII or the Constitution, 1 RR it would be unfortunate if this distinction developed. 189
Another factor that may be influencing judicial decisions to grant
preferential remedies is the number of positions involved. The
courts have tended to order preferential remedies primarily in cases
involving relatively few jobs.10O This tendency suggests that the impact of such remedies is far more limited than the controversy over
them would seem to indicate. In a few cases, however, courts have
granted preferential remedies when the number of positions was
great.191 Thus, it is not clear how significant this factor is.
Most of the title VII cases in which preferences have been
granted have involved union membership or issuance of union work
permits rather than hiring or promotion.192 It is easier for a court
to grant a preferential remedy in a case where union membership
is at issue because the problem of reverse discrimination rarely arises
when a court compels the admission of minority workers into an allwhite union. Unless there is a direct relationship between union
membership and job placement and the number of memberships is
limited, the admission of Blacks or women into the union does not
directly affect the job opportunities to white males. However, a
number of courts have recognized that union membership may often
be the equivalent of a job.193 This is especially true in the construction industry, where many of the title VII cases have arisen, since
188. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (197S); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
189. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 138, 501 F.2d 622, 632-33 (2d Cir.
1974), in which the court granted a preferential remedy for minority workers but
excluded statistics concerning women in determining the appropriate minority hiring
goals. In doing so, the court reasoned that women had never shown an interest in
becoming steamfitters. Because women's disinterest may well have reflected the
knowledge that they would be excluded, the court's reasoning is specious. Bui see
Schaefer v. Tannian, 394 F. Supp. 1136 (E.D. Mich. 197S).
190. See, e.g., Erie Human Relations Commn. v. Tullio, 493 F.2d 371 (3d Cir.
1971) (20 positions); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 31S (8th Cir. 1971) (20 posi•
tions). This may, for example, have been a factor in United States v. N.L. Indus.,
Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973), where the court granted a preferential remedy for 15 foreman positions but rejected a preferential remedy where one third of
all white-collar positions was involved.
191. See, e.g., NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 617 (5th Cir. 1974) (one-Blackto-one-White hiring ratio until 25 per cent of the approximately 930 Alabama Dept.
of Public Safety employees were Black); United States v. Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d
408, 412 (2d Cir. 1973) (one-Black-to-one-White ratio in the issuance of 250 work
permits annually for three years).
192. See cases cited in note 121 supra.
193. See text at note 126 supra.
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contractors almost always favor union members. Thus, it is a short
jump from preferences in union membership or union work permits
to actual job preferences, and the courts should not have difficulty
making this jump. The remedy should be available in either situation.
Another factor influencing the decisions of some courts is the
degree of cooperation or resistance by the employer or union in
undertaking measures designed to remedy discrimination. The Supreme Court noted in the context of school desegregation that "[j]udicial authority enters only when local authority defaults."194 Similarly, in the employment context, the severity of the remedy may
depend on how intractable the employer has been. If the employer
is actively and in good faith attempting to recruit minority or women
applicants to overcome the effects of past discrimination, there may
be no need to order a controversial preferential remedy. Thus, the
fact that the courts only order these severe remedies when employers make no adequate voluntary effort to eliminate the effects of past
discrimination both limits the· number of court-ordered preferences
and encourages voluntary action. Of course, where the employer
is recalcitrant in recruiting or hiring minority or women applicants,
a preferential order may be the only means of forcing an end to discrimination.195
One final factor that seems to enter into decisions on the appropriateness of preferential remedies is the stage at which the employment relationship is to be subjected to the remedy. Most of the
cases in which preferences have been ordered involve the hiring of
new employees. Although a preference in initial hiring does tend
to favor one applicant at the expense of another, neither has a vested
right to be hired and any expectation of favorable action on the part
of the white male applicant is less legitimate than in situations such
as promotion based on seniority. In the promotion cases based on
seniority, the courts must balance the utility of preferential remedies
in ending discrimination with the legitimate expectations of white
employees. The courts' problem seems to be more acute in promotion and layoff cases, where white males often have long-held expectations, than in the hiring cases where the expectations are less clear.
The courts are split on the advisability of ordering preferences
in promotion cases and the decision in each case may depend on
194. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
195. See note 185 supra and accompanying text Similarly, the Court in Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), ordered affirmative remedies when the school board did not voluntarily integrate.
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its particular facts. For example, in Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v.
Bridgeport-Civil Service Commission, 196 the court approved a preference for initial hiring, but rejected a preference for promotions. It
noted that an imbalance in higher ranks is often due to discrimination at the entry level, not to discrimination in promotion per se;
thus, there was no history of discriminatory promotions to correct and
correction of hiring discrimination would naturally correct imbalances at higher levels over time. 197 This argument overlooks the
importance of ending the effects of discriminatory patterns within
a reasonable period. Perhaps more persuasive is the court's argument that when promotion has traditionally had a time-in-grade requirement or been granted in order of seniority, legitimate career
expectations of nonminority workers are thwarted solely because of
their color or sex if minority or female workers are preferred.198
Many nonminority workers have invested years under the assumption that they would receive promotions under the traditional procedure;. denial of this expectation may have the effect of exacerbating tensions between them and the preferred group. In such cases,
it may be wise to reject outright preferences in favor of procedures
designed to facilitate more indirectly access to higher level jobs, such
as reducing the number of years that must be spent in lower level
jobs.199 Where, on the other hand, there is no legitimate expectation of promotion (for instance, where the promotion decision has
traditionally been made at the discretion of the company), it is easier
to order a preferential remedy. 200 This seems closer to the hiring
case, since, although there may occasionally be some inequity, nonminority employees are not deprived of a benefit that they had reason to expect.201
Analogous to the promotion-by-right problem is the fictional
seniority problem that has been raised in layoff cases. Many minority and women workers, only recently hired under affirmative action
programs, have been laid off during the present recession under "last
196. 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973).
197. 482 F.2d at 1339.
198. 482 F.2d at 1341. But see note 199 infra.
199. For example, the court in Bridgeport Guardians approved a reduction in the
time-in-grade requirement and a reduction in the weight given to seniority. 482 F.2d
at 1341.
200. See, e.g., United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354, 367-69, 377
(8th Cir. 1973).
201. In addition, this promotion procedure may make it easier to prove that there
was discrimination in promotion decisions if, for example, supervisors consistently
chose Whites over Blacks for promotions.
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hired, first fired" seniority systems. 202 Thus, the gains that were
made over the past ten years are in danger of being lost through layoffs in the recession of the seventies. Since our economy will always
be subject to cycles, if "last hired, first fired" is upheld, the achievement of equal opportunity may be slowed or halted. 203
The courts are split on the question whether to grant fictional
seniority to minority and women workers in order to insulate them
from layoffs and protect the gains in job opportunities that have been
made. 204 Those courts that have granted fictional seniority have
reasoned that since minority and female workers would have been
hired years earlier but for the discrimination, it is not improper to
grant fictional seniority to put them in the position in which they
would have been absent historical discrimination.
However, since the effect of this remedy is to cause the displacement of white male employees in favor of minority and female employees, it directly conflicts with the oft-cited dictum in Papermakers
Local 189 v. United States. 205 In that decision, the Fifth Circuit
stated in effect that employees with real seniority should never be
displaced by less senior employees pursuant to a court order altering
an existing seniority system: "[C]reating fictional employment time
for newly-hired Negroes would comprise preferential rather than remedial treatment. The clear thrust of the Senate debate [concerning sections 703(h) and (j)] is directed against such preferential
202. See authorities cited in note 161 supra.
203. The ultimate impact of cyclical recessions on affirmative action programs
depends on a number of factors including the frequency and severity of the recessions, the relative seniority of minority workers, and the number of.minority workers
who either are not recalled, or forfeit their recall rights. See generally Note, supra
note 44, at 1569 n.105. It is possible and indeed probable that some minority workers will survive each recession without a layoff and that a number will be recalled
and return to work when the economy swings upward. They would then accumulate
seniority, which would make them more resistant to layoff in the next downturn.
Thus, the most likely effect of cyclical recessions is to slow, rather than to halt, the
achievement of equal employment goals.
204. Compare Delay v. Carling Brewing Co., 10 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 164
(N.D. Ga. 1974), and Loy v. City of Cleveland, 8 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 614,
dismissed as moot, 8 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 617 (N.D. Ohio 1974), with Jersey
Cent. Power & Light Co. v. !BEW Local 327, 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975); Waters
v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Intl. Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974);
United Affirmative Action Commn. v. Gleason, 10 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 64
(D. Ore. 1974), and Watkins v. Steelworkers Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir.
1975). Cf. Papermakers Local 189 v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 994-95 (5th Cir.
1969); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). See generally Blumrosen & Blumrosen, Layoff or Work Sharing: The Civil Rights Act of
1964 in the Recession of 1975, 1 EMPLOYEE RBI.. L.J. 2 (1975); Friedman & Katz,
Retroactive Seniority for the Identifiable Victim Under Title VII-Must Last Hired
First Fired Give Way?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 28TH .ANNuAL CoNF.ERENCB ON
LABOR, N.Y.U. (1975); Note, supra note 44.
205. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969).
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treatment on the basis of race." 206 However, the court did uphold
the district court's order creating a company-wide seniority system.
This order had been issued to minimize the residual effects of a formerly segregated department structure. That structure was being
perpetuated by a departmental seniority system under which only
time worked in a department was credited toward seniority in the
department. The court seemed persuaded that the company-wide
seniority system was the most reasonable way to preserve the earned
expectations of long-service employees while reducing the discriminatory effects of fulfilling those expectations.
The Papermakers dictum was followed in Waters v. Wisconsin
Steel Works of International Harvester Co. 207 In that case, the court
refused to alter a "last hired, first fired" layoff system even though
preserving the system meant that a disproportionate number of recently hired Blacks who did not yet have contractual seniority would
not be rehired. 208 The court expressed concern that "[t]o hold
otherwise would be tantamount to shackling white employees with
a burden of a past discrimination created not by them but by their
employer"209 and noted that title VII was not designed to affect
"last hired, first fired" seniority provisions. 210
Similarly, in Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, 211 the
Third Circuit reversed a district court order that would have granted
fictional seniority to women and minority employees to protect earlier affirmative action gains during a period of layoffs. 212 The court
206. 416 F.2d at 995.
207. 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974).
208. Under the employment contract, new employees accrued no seniority until
the completion of a 90-day probationary period. 502 F.2d at 1313. The court did,
however, hold that laid-off white employees who had accepted severance pay and thus
terminated their contractual rights could not be rehired before Blacks with contractual seniority were recalled since this would amount to "presently perpetuating
the racial discrimination of the past." 502 F.2d at 1321.
209. 502 F.2d at 1320.
210. 502 F.2d at 13-17-20. The legislative history of title VII provides some
support for the court's stance: "Seniority rights are in no way affected by the bill.
If under a 'last hired, first fired' agreement a Negro happens to be the 'last hired,'
he can still be 'first fired' as long as it is done because of his status as 'last hired'
and not because of his race." 502 F.2d at 1318, quoting 110 CoNo. REc. 7217
(1964) (questions and answers prepared by Senator Clark). See also 110 CO!'IG,
REC. 6563-64 (remarks of Senator Kuchel), 7207 (Dept. of Justice memorandum),
7213 (Clark-Case memorandum) (1964).
211. 508 F.2d 687 (3d Cir. 1975).
212. The company had entered into a collective bargaining agreement under
which it agreed that any layoffs would be by reverse seniority. However, the company had also entered into a conciliation agreement with the EEOC that established
a five-year affirmative action plan designed to increase the percentage of women and
minority employees. The district court found that if the company followed "last
hired, first fired," the percentage of minority employees would decrease and this
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noted that section 703(h) of title VIl213 on its face en101ns the
courts from interfering with a "bona fide" seniority sytem;214 it
"conclude[d] in light of the legislative history that on balance a facially neutral company-wide seniority system, without more, is· a bona
fide seniority system and will be sustained even though it may operate to the disadvantage of females and minority groups as a result
of past employment practices." 215
Nevertheless, a few federal district courts have struck down layoff provisions that would affect a disproportionate number of minority workers. For instance, in Watkins v. United Steelworkers Local
2369,216 the court found that the legislative history surrounding section 703(h) did not clearly preclude the granting of a preferential
remedy in a layoff situation. The court observed that the interpretative comments regarding seniority were made during the Senate debates prior to the time when section 703(h) was inserted into title
Vll. It therefore concluded that these remarks could not be considered determinative in construing the statute.· Rather, the court
ruled that section 703(h) literally protected only bona fide seniority
systems and that a system perpetuating the effects of past discrimination cannot be bona fide. 217 The court rejected the Papermakers
dictum as mere "remarks . . . made without the benefit of adversary
arguments" 218 and noted that since the Fifth Circuit in Papermakers
had altered an existing seniority system in order to desegregate various jobs within a company, there was no reason why a company that
had refused to hire Blacks at all should be allowed to perpetuate
would violate the conciliation agreement The Third Circuit reversed, holding that
the company's duty under the conciliation agreement was to use affirmative action
in hiring, but that there was no such duty in laying off employees. 508 F.2d at 703.
213. Section 703(h) provides, in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to
a bona fide seniority or merit system • • . provided that such differences are not
the result of an intention to discriminate because of -race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
214. 508 F.2d at 705.
215. 508 F.2d at 710 (emphasis original). The court also noted that the collective bargaining agreement did not violate public policy as enunciated by title VII,
since section 703 (h) does not permit interference with a bona fide seniority system.
508 F.2d at 705.
216. 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974). See also Schaefer v. Tannian, 394 F.
Supp. 1136 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Delay v. Carling Brewing Co., 10 BNA Fair Emp.
Prac. Cas. 164 (N.D. Ga. 1974).
217. 369 F. Supp. at 1227-29.
218. 369 F. Supp. at 1229.
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the effects of that discrimination through its seniority rules. 219 Thus,
the court in effect found that any detriment to nonminority employees was, on balance, outweighed by the need to overcome the effects
of past discrimination.
This decision, however, was reversed by the Fifth Circuit. 220
That court held that neither title VII nor section 1981 barred the
use of a long-established seniority system, adopted without intent to
discriminate, even though minority-employee balance would be adversely affected. But the court noted as part of its deliberately narrow holding that the employer's hiring practices had been nondiscriminatory for over ten years and that none of the individual employees laid off had personally been the victim of prior employment
discrimination. 221 The court
specifically [did] not decide the rights of a laid-off employee who
could show that, but for the discriminatory refusal to hire him at an
earlier time than the date of his actual employment, or but for his
failure to obtain earlier employment because of exclusion of minority
employees from the work force, he would have sufficient seniority to
insulate him against layoff. 222

The Fifth Circuit decision in Watkins suggests the two parts into
which the fictional seniority-layoff problem can be divided. First,
there is the problem of the appropriate remedy for individuals who
have suffered specific instances of discrimination. For example, a
minority person who applied for a job two years ago and was rejected
because of race would most likely be ordered hired and given back
pay for the two-year period. But if a company using a "last hired,
first fired" seniority system decides to lay off some workers, the same
minority employee will have no seniority and will be the first to go.
In such a case, where the specific discriminatees can be identified,
retroactive seniority should be granted. 223 The white male workers
who might be disadvantaged are not really being treated unfairly because they will be in exactly the same position as that in which they
219. 369 F. Supp. at 1229.
220. Watkins v. United Steelworkers Local 2369, 516 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1975),
221. Indeed, the black employees involved had been with the company for from
two to seven years at the time the Whites who would be denied recall by the reinstatement of the Blacks had been hired. 516 F.2d at 46.
222. 516 F.2d at 45.
223. In fact, this remedy has been approved by at least two circuit courts. See
Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975); Jurinko v. Edwin L.
Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir. 1973). But see Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 495 F.2d 398, 417-18 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 420 U.S. 983 (1975).
The court of appeals in Franks held that a court cannot grant fictional seniority to
black job applicants who were refused employment because of racial discrimination
even though the discrimination occurred subsequent to the passage of title VII.
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would have been but for the discrimination. While it may be true
that white males should not be prejudiced by the company's past discrimination, there is no reason why they should retain an unearned
advantage. 224 Besides, the retroactive seniority remedy, when limited to identifiable discriminatees, would have no effect on most employees, since the basic seniority system would be left intact.
The more difficult problem arises when a company with a long
history of discrimination finally starts hiring Blacks and women,
though none hired are specific discriminatees. If the employer then
finds it necessary to cut back its work force, and fictional seniority
is granted to the recently hired Blacks and women, Whites who had
an expectation of continued employment or promotion based on their
seniority will find their expectations thwarted because of their race
or sex. However, if the remedy is denied, a round of layoffs can
restore the earlier raciai or sexual employee imbalance.
The legislative history of section 703(h) suggests tliat whether
or not Congress actually meant to prohibit fictional seniority as a
remedy under title VTI, it did not intend affirmatively to endorse
that remedy. 225 In the absence of any clear legislative mandate, the
courts should at least scrutinize the layoff-fictional seniority cases
very carefully and attempt to find some other means of handling the
problem. One possibility might be to reduce the hours of all the
company's employees where possible to distribute the burden of past
224. Some support for this position may be found in the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 43 U.S.L.W. 4880 (U.S. June 25, 1975),
where the Court discussed the standards by which back pay should be awarded after
proof of a violation of title VII. First, the Court made it clear that title VII "requires
that persons aggrieved by the consequences and effects of the unlawful practice be,
so far as possible, restored to a position where they would have been were it not
for the unlawful discrimination." 43 U.S.L.W. at 4885, quoting 118 CONG. R.Ec.
7168 (1972). Second, the Court observed that the remedial provisions of title VII
were fashioned after the remedial provisions of the National Labor Relations Act and
should therefore be construed in a manner consistent with case precedent under the
NLRA. See 43 U.S.L.W. at 4884, 4885 n.16. Reinstatement with back pay and with
retroactive seniority rights is a common remedy for victims of unfair labor practices
under the NLRA. See, e.g., NLRB v. Lone Star Textiles, Inc., 386 F.2d 535, 537
(5th Cir. 1967); Ventre Packing Co., Inc., 163 N.L.R.B. 540, 543 (1967); Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 255 n.44 (1962); West Boylston Mfg. Co., 87
N.L.R.B. 808, 813 (1949). Although many of the NLRA cases have involved discriminatory discharg~, the NLRB has also awarded retroactive seniority to victims
of unlawful discrimination in refusal to hire cases. See, e.g., Aclang, Inc., 193
N.L.R.B. 86 (1971); Bob's Casing Crews, 178 N.L.R.B. 3 (1969). Thus, in following the suggestions made by the Supreme Court in Albermarle that victims of unlawful discrimination should be "restored to a position where they would have been were
it not for the unlawful discrimination" and that the case law under the NLRA should
be followed in developing remedies under title VII, it will not be surprising to see
the Court hold that persons who have been unlawfully denied job-rights at the hiring
stage may be awarded both back pay and retroactive seniority under title VII.
225. See note 210 supra and accompanying text.
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discrimination. Alternatively, the employer might rotate those employees on layoff, so that each employee could work some weeks
and be on layoff other weeks. 226
Part of the problem when there are no specific discriminatees
is that there is no way to determine whether the workers who benefit from fictional seniority are the same workers who were hurt by
the company's prior discrimination, and, conversely, there is no way
to tell how much the nonminority workers benefited from the discrimination. In many cases there will be no correlation for either
minority or nonminority workers between their individual positions
and the discrimination. Although this problem also exists in the
preferential hiring cases, it is less serious in those cases because they
do not involve impingements upon long-standing expectations of
nonminority workers and therefore are not likely to create as much
tension. Thus, fictional seniority cases should be even more strictly
scrutinized than hiring preferences, with an eye toward working out
some compromise that will thwart neither the white male's job expectations nor the movement toward equal employment opportunity.
V.

CONCLUSION

Preferential remedies are now an acceptable means of eradicating the effects of past discrimination. However, because such remedies raise a number of legal and moral questions concerning reverse
discrimination against white male workers, their use is strictly limited. They are only employed to eliminate the effects of past dis226. These possible alternatives were proposed in New York City Commn. on
Human Rights, Interpretive Memorandum Concerning Procedures Required by Federal, State, and Local Anti-Discrimination Laws When an Employer Is Planning Reduction in Labor Costs That Could Result in Layoffs, n.d., discussed in Laying OfI
Employees Pursuant to a Seniority System, 9 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. supp., at
1, 11 (Feb. 22, 1975).
The EEOC bas recently issued guidelines on seniority-based layoffs that indicate
that there is reasonable cause to believe that an employer violates title VII "by conducting layoffs pursuant to a seniority system which operates to exclude a disproportionate number of Black employees because of past discrimination." EEOC Decision
No. 75-251, 10 BNA Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. 1405 (May 8, 1975). Thus, it may be
that a union bas a duty to propose alternatives to "last hired, first fired" layoff and
recall procedures when such a system will have the effect of perpetuating past dis•
crimination. A number of courts have recognized that the union's duty of fair representation includes a duty at least to attempt to negotiate seniority systems that do
not lock minority employees into the lowest positions in the company. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1915); Johnson v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1381-82 (5th Cir. 1974). If a union can be held
liable for acquiescing in a departmental seniority system that locks minority employees into low-level jobs, it seems entirely logical also to bold the union liable for acquiescing in a seniority system that actually denies employment to minority employees who have little seniority because of past discrimination.
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crimination and only when no alternative means exist for accomplishing that goal. They are always temporary remedies, set to expire
as soon as the past discrimination is corrected. Finally, they are only
granted to qualified applicants who could be employed even if preferences were not ordered. As a result, preferential remedies have
been ordered only in a relatively small number of cases.
The limitations emphasize the main problem faced by the courts
in preferential remedy cases-that of balancing the interests of
minority workers in equal employment opportunity with the interests
of nonminority workerS' in employment. This balancing is necessary
both because preferential remedies are equitable in nature and
should therefore be as fair as possible to all concerned and because
the courts in employment cases serve the goal of equal employment
while equalizing the position of minority workers if people of different races and sexes are to work side by side.
·
All things considered, preferential remedies as presently used by
the courts in employment cases serve the goal of equal employment
opportunity and support the ultimate achievement of the principle
of "color blindness;" these remedies are therefore a valuable weapon
in the fight against discrimination.
[Professor Edwards' views on "last hired, first fired" and "fictional seniority'' are more fully set forth in a paper entitled The Cost
of Equality: Civil Rights During Periods of Economic Stress, delivered as part of the David C. Baum Memorial Lecture Series at
the University of Illinois Law School on October 30, 1975. This
paper will be published by the University of Illinois-Ed.]

